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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Rule #1: “Insist on proving that torture was inflicted. 
 
This guidance was included in a notorious al-Qaeda handbook that 
was discovered in a Manchester, England safehouse.1 That handbook raised 
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eyebrows for not only its meticulously cold direction toward facilitating 
terrorist operations, but also for its perceptive legal savvy relating to West-
ern courts.2 But, while the extent of how far this manual was followed is 
certainly questionable, the fact remains that accused terrorist operatives 
since September 11, 2001 have followed its principles relating to the torture 
message and are credited with ―paralyzing‖ international intelligence ser-
vices and military operations in a manner that is much more effective than 
bombs and rifles.3 As such, this tactic goes beyond merely scoring public 
relations points, and instead achieves tangible tactical victories, albeit in an 
unconventional manner. The weapon is an attorney and the battlefield is the 
courts. The battle cry is ―torture.‖ It has taken nearly a decade for world 
governments to develop a means for fighting back. 
Detainees and litigants ranging from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to Pa-
kistani courts have dutifully followed principles of the step-by-step al-
Qaeda handbook instruction as their torture claims blitzed through the me-
dia and legal systems.4 Defense counsel and human rights organizations 
  
1
 In United Kingdom v. Abu Hamza, a convicted terrorist was found to be in possession of 
the manual. Abu Hamza has since appealed to the European Court of Human Rights in Stras-
bourg. See The Al Qaeda Manual, http://www.justice.gov/ag/manualpart1_1.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2010). 
 2 The U.S. Department of Justice posting of the manual was controversial because some 
worried that it would provide wider reach for potential terrorists. See Matthew Davis, US 
Under Fire over al-Qaeda Guide, BBC NEWS, July 27, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
americas/4722833.stm; see also Tung Yin, Boumediene and Lawfare, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 
865, 880–84 (2009) (describing how the al-Qaeda manual relates to lawfare as detainees 
provoke action from the guards in order to exploit and manipulate the system); see also Da-
vid B. Rivkin et al, Lawfare, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2007, at A11(stating that the al-Qaeda 
manual instructs detained operatives to claim torture and mistreatment). 
 3 The deadly 2010 suicide bombing against CIA officials in Khost, Afghanistan and the 
1993 shooting attack outside CIA headquarters in Northern Virginia caused some ripple 
effects, but did not directly cause massive effects on worldwide intelligence operations. In 
contrast, civil lawsuits filed in U.K. courts against British government security agencies such 
as MI5 and MI6 by accused al-Qaeda terror operatives such as Binyam Mohamad and Moaz-
zam Begg are said to have ―‗paralyzed‘ the security services with legal paperwork.‖ See Tom 
Dunn, Terror Camp Compensation Sham, THE SUN, July 7, 2010, 
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/3044275/Terror-camp-compo-sham-12-get-
payouts-up-to-500k-each.html. 
 4 Top JTF-GTMO officials, as well as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld offer de-
tailed instances of detainees using manual guidance during and after detention. See Donna 
Miles, Al Qaeda Manual Drives Detainee Behavior at Guantanamo Bay, AM. FORCES PRESS 
SERVICE, June 29, 2005, http://www.defense.gov//News/NewsArticle.aspx? ID=16270; see 
also Al-Adahi v. Obama, 2010 WL 2756551, at 9 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 13, 2010) (emphasis added) 
(―The court‘s omissions are particularly striking in light of the instructions in al-Qaida‘s 
training manuals for resisting interrogation. For those who belong to al-Qaida, ‗[c]onfronting 
the interrogator and defeating him is part of your jihad.‘ To this end al-Qaida members are 
instructed to resist interrogation by developing a cover story, by refusing to answer ques-
tions, by recanting or changing answers already given, by giving as vague an answer as poss-
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continued the ―torture‖ narrative as they amassed public relations, political, 
and legal victories.5 For example, federal judges in habeas corpus cases 
ordered accused terrorists freed because the government often could not 
prove the negative, or in other words, had no evidence one way or the other 
that could contest both detainee and witness assertions that torture oc-
curred.6 A military commission case against an Afghani accused of attack-
ing a U.S. Army convoy in 2002 did not fare much better for the govern-
ment after confessions to American interrogators were thrown out due to 
assertions that Afghan forces issued verbal threats at the time of capture.7 
All of this had occurred masterfully despite the fact that many other 
torture and mistreatment claims were quietly debunked.8 Still, the tactic was 
proving to be a winner with politicians and the media, as well as the cour-
troom. In 2009, Barack Obama‘s first act as President was to remove the 
international rebuke over Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) by ordering its detai-
nees transferred to a U.S. prison facility.9 This offered proof that the al-
Qaeda guidance of using lawfare—legal recourse as a weapon in shaping 
the global battlefield—was reaping dividends.10 And, indeed, the law has 
been used as a weapon. Consider that the North Vietnamese military tactic 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s was to use battlefield attrition and guerrilla 
warfare to wear down the American public‘s will to continue supporting the 
fight. In the case of the war against al-Qaeda, a calculated legal effort has 
accomplished similar tactical objectives without the need to conduct major 
  
ible, and by claiming torture. Put bluntly, the instructions to detainees are to make up a story 
and lie.‖). 
 5 See generally Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantanamo: Rights at the Brink of Dehu-
manization, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1683 (2009). Efforts against others via administrative 
means also took place to include complaints with state medical boards relating to psycholo-
gists who treated Guantanamo Bay detainees. See Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Psychologists 
Face Guantanamo Abuse Claim, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 7, 2010, available at http://www. 
cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2010/07/army_psychologists_face_guanta.html. 
 6 By suppressing statements and evidence derived by witnesses who were alleged to have 
been tortured, there was not enough evidence left to justify detention. See Abdah v. Obama, 
2010 WL 1626073, at *6–7 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2010). 
 7 Military Commission Ruling, United States v. Jawad (CMCR) (No. 08-4), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/d20081223Jawadexhibitsa-h.pdf. 
 8 See United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008) (agreeing with the lower 
court‘s ruling that found itself ―left with lingering questions concerning the credibility of Mr. 
Abu Ali and his claim that he was tortured‖); see also United States v. Paracha, 313 
Fed.Appx. 347, 349–50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 9 Mark Mazzetti, Obama Issues Directive to Shut Down Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
22, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/us/politics/22gitmo.html. 
 10 Colonel Kelly D. Wheaton, Strategic Lawyering: Realizing the Potential of Military 
Lawyers at the Strategic Level, THE ARMY LAW., Sept. 2006, at 1; see also Lawfare, The 
Latest in Asymmetries, Council on Foreign Relations (Mar. 18, 2003), http://www.cfr.org/ 
publication.html?id=5772 (―Lawfare is a strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for 
traditional military means to achieve military objectives.‖).  
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offensive operations.11 By following what was tantamount to scripted legal 
advice, detainees and their advocates in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks 
launched a massive campaign through various court systems worldwide.12 
The common theme of these legal attacks was ―torture.‖13 And the weight of 
these attacks went beyond the confines of moral and public relations argu-
ments as they also led to policy and strategic pressures that were far re-
moved from the courtroom. The result often manifested itself into a form of 
tactical lawfare due to al-Qaeda‘s ability to shape the physical battlefield 
through its cumulative legal approach.14 
However, the story does not end there. Subtle but significant 
changes in 2010 toward how claims of torture are handled within the Mili-
tary Commissions courtroom appear to offer a de facto method of fighting 
back against dubious assertions.15 And, perhaps even more significant, is 
widespread evidence that the detainees themselves—longtime adherents to 
the principles of the al-Qaeda guidance—began clamoring in 2009 to re-
main in the relative Geneva Convention-sanctioned luxury of GTMO rather 
than transfer to an awaiting life of isolation and institutionalization within 
the U.S. prison system.16 Finally, options exist that can be implemented to 
significantly phase out the ability of al-Qaeda and its supporters to use the 
  
 11 Poll numbers have steadily dropped in regard to Afghanistan War support, while al-
Qaeda and Taliban leaders such as Abdul Hafiz have been released from Guantanamo Bay 
and returned to the fight against the United States and its allies. See Susan Crabtree, Republi-
cans to Obama: No Detainee Transfers to Afghanistan, THE HILL, Mar. 30, 2010, 
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/89819-gop-lawmakers-to-obama-no-detainee-
transfers-to-afghanistan-. But like the Vietnam-era political climate where the majority of 
Americans were arguably in support of the war and were merely overshadowed by anti-war 
activists, a similar climate is occurring in regard to the Afghanistan War and Guantanamo 
Bay detention policy. See 75% Worried That Gitmo Closing will Set Dangerous Terrorists 
Free, RASMUSSEN REPORTS, Aug. 25, 2009, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_ 
content/politics/general_politics/august_2009/75_worried_that_gitmo_closing_will_set_dang
erous_terrorists_free. 
 12 While many of the landmark cases adjudicated broader detainee rights, the significant 
undercurrent revolved around torture and mistreatment. See Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. 
Supp. 2d 191, 192–93 (D.D.C. 2008). See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 
(2006); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 13 See generally Abu Ali, supra note 8; see also U.S. v. Abu Ali, 395 F.Supp.2d 338 
(E.D.Va. 2008) (Mem. Opinion). 
 14 Dungan offers an excellent analysis on lawfare strategies employed by detainees at or 
near the point of capture. Captain C. Peter Dungan, Fighting Lawfare at the Special Opera-
tions Task Force Level, SPECIAL WARFARE, Mar.–Apr. 2008, at 9. 
 15 See DEP‘T. OF DEF., THE MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS (Apr. 27, 2010) (signed 
into effect by Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense); See also Military Commissions Act of 
2009, 10 U.S.C. § 948 (2009). 
 16 The author has conducted various interviews with sources that deal directly with the 
detainees. Alex Spillius, Guantanamo Suspects Want to Stay, Say Officials, TELEGRAPH, 
Nov. 1, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/6481071/ 
Guantnamo-suspects-want-to-stay-say-officials.html. 
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cumulative mistreatment narrative as ammunition for waging tactical law-
fare. 
II.  CLAIMING TORTURE TO SHAPE THE BATTLEFIELD 
If lawfare was al-Qaeda‘s battlefield tactic, then the ―torture‖ battle 
cry must also be construed as its ammunition. The first publicized claims of 
torture relating to the U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks occurred almost im-
mediately after photographs emanating from Guantanamo Bay‘s Camp X-
Ray leaked to the press.17 The photos featured men in orange jumpsuits liv-
ing in outdoor cages.18 Interestingly, Camp X-Ray was initially built as a 
detention facility for Haitian migrants during the 1990s.19 And, despite the 
fact that the orange jump suits and Camp X-ray cages were limited to the 
first GTMO arrivals during a two-month span, the image and legacy en-
dures.20 
From there, photographs from Iraq‘s Abu Ghraib prison became a 
national embarrassment while ―waterboarding‖ became a household term, 
particularly after the U.S. government acknowledged that this activity took 
place against at least two detainees.21 But waterboarding was only one com-
plaint relating to both the confirmed and alleged use of torture perpetrated 
  
 17 In Pictures: Camp X-Ray Prisoners, BBC News, Jan. 20, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/americas/1771816.stm. 
 18 Id. 
 19 MAJOR CHRISTOPHER A. BROWN, GUANTANAMO BAY: A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, 8 
(Air University Press 2008); see also Joseph C. Sweeney, Guantanamo and U.S. Law, 30 
FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 673, 715–16 (2007). 
 20 Sweeney, supra note 19, at n.193. (―Guantanamo‘s uses as a detention center or prison, 
designed to produce intelligence for the war on terror rather than to serve punitive or correc-
tional purposes, began in January 2002 when a temporary external stockade, Camp X-Ray, 
was hastily thrown together to receive prisoners from the Afghanistan War. A more elaborate 
facility, Camp Delta, was quickly constructed for interrogation as the number of prisoners 
multiplied; another facility, Camp Echo, would be constructed for client interviews after they 
were authorized. Prison construction has continued with Camp Five, a super-maximum secu-
rity prison for the most incorrigible and uncooperative and Camp Six, a barracks with com-
munal conditions for minimal risk prisoners. A temporary facility for juveniles was also 
provided.‖); see also Morris D. Davis, In Defense of Guantanamo Bay, 117 YALE L.J. 
POCKET PART 21 (2007). 
 21 Waterboarding—an interrogation technique that uses water to simulate drowning and 
suffocation—has been around in various forms since the 1400s. After WWII, a military 
commission convicted Japanese officer Yukio Asano for using waterboarding against a civi-
lian. A U.S. soldier during the Vietnam War was court martialed after a Washington Post 
photograph captured an image of a waterboarding interrogation. Texas Sheriff James Parker 
was convicted in 1983 for waterboarding prisoners. Eric Weiner, Waterboarding: A Tortured 
History, NPR (Nov. 3, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=158868 
34. 
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by U.S. officials.22 In fact, the U.S. practice of officially condoning limited 
uses of torture, such as waterboarding, prior to 2005 provided a credible 
foundation for the al-Qaeda lawfare tactic as it festered and ultimately exhi-
bited signs of exponential growth to be exploited.23 
Throughout the decade, countless purported terror suspects seized 
on this as they continuously invoked the torture message as a means of at-
tacking and shaping policy on the so-called War on Terrorism.24 By latching 
onto the torture narrative through the confirmed instances of mistreatment, 
and further taking this narrative onto the record in various legal forums, the 
tactic served to irreparably harm the image of the United States, removed 
the benefit of the doubt pertaining to government efforts to combat torture 
allegations, and consequently the government‘s ability to effectively prose-
cute both a war and its accused war criminals.25 This, in turn, caused 
changes in U.S. military tactics. One prime example became known in early 
2010 where it was opined that the Obama administration was seeking to kill 
potential al-Qaeda targets via aircraft and drones rather than capture them 
for higher intelligence exploitation.26 That policy is cited as a direct re-
sponse to the higher legal scrutiny derived from the many damaging torture 
claims that continue to be made.27 In this regard, the lawfare tactic has gone 
beyond being a mere courtroom sideshow. It has actually caused military 
and intelligence operations to change in a manner historically reserved for 
battlefield adaption pertaining to enemy combat activity. 
A.  Tactical Lawfare 
Captain C. Peter Dungan, an attorney attached to the U.S. Army‘s 
3rd Special Forces Group, stated that the traditional concept of lawfare is 
―like a computer virus or a hacker‘s denial of service attack on a network, 
  
 22 See Amos N. Guiora & Erin M. Page, The Unholy Trinity: Intelligence, Interrogation 
and Torture, 37 CASE. W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 427, 444 (2006); see also Leila Nadya Sadat, 
Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law, 37 
CASE. W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 309, 340–41 (2006). 
 23 See Guiora, supra note 22, at 437–38. 
 24 Dungan, supra note 14, at 10; see also Al-Adahi, supra note 4. 
 25 See Sonni Efron, Prison Abuse Seen as Hurting U.S. Credibility, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 
2005, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jan/14/world/fg-rights14 (explaining that numerous 
foreign governments latched onto the mistreatment narrative while human rights organiza-
tions called for legal action to ―restore U.S. moral authority.‖). 
 26 Government officials expressed concern about where to house and interrogate such 
high-value individuals that could be effectively captured in light of the higher scrutiny and 
impending closure of GTMO. Therefore, while killing these individuals got them off the 
street, it robbed the government of valuable intelligence in regard to the terror operations. 
See Karen Deyoung & Joby Warrick, Under Obama, more Targeted Killings than Captures 
in Counterterrorism Efforts, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/13/AR2010021303748.html. 
 27 Id. 
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[where] meritless suits seek to grind the wheels of justice to a halt.‖28 While 
that analogy describes the effects of al-Qaeda‘s cumulative legal approach 
into worldwide court systems, the concept of tactical lawfare goes a step 
further. Tactical lawfare is the added notion of using legal and administra-
tive systems to more directly shape the physical battlefield.29 For example, 
detainees captured by indigenous forces in Iraq and Afghanistan often re-
portedly make a point to claim abuse at the point of capture.30 The same 
detainees will then claim abuse when turned over to U.S. or allied forces, 
and finally report additional abuse if they are retained in custody for pend-
ing legal action.31 What happens is that U.S. or allied forces are duty bound 
per regulations and law to investigate all claims of abuse.32 Furthermore, the 
burden of proof often is on the government when claims of torture or abuse 
are levied. The result pertaining to the tactical lawfare concept is that mul-
tiple layers of resources and manpower relating to both front-line and sup-
port roles are diverted directly away from the battlefield in order to partici-
pate in the investigatory process.33 In short, the tactical lawfare approach of 
waging cumulative abuse claims is just as effective as conventional physical 
attacks in removing military/intelligence personnel and resources from the 
battlefield. 
But tactical lawfare is not limited to the area of combat operations. 
As this cumulative approach of claiming abuse moves from the administra-
tive regulations level and into the courts, a similar scenario plays out in 
  
 28 Dungan supra note 14, at 10. 
 29 The author in this current paper contends that tactical lawfare can be employed in a 
much wider-ranging scope in terms of a universal and cumulative approach to using global 
legal systems as a means to directly impact tactical and operational military endeavors. See 
also Major John W. Bellflower, The Influence of Law on Command of Space, 65 A.F.L. REV. 
107, 113 n.31 (2010) (The tactical level of war is defined as ―[t]he level of war at which 
battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to 
tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and 
maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat 
objectives.‖) (citing JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 1-02, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND 
ASSOCIATED TERMS 534 (Mar. 17, 2009) available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_ 
pubs/jp1_02.pdf)) (Bellflower defines tactical lawfare in the context of an enemy taking 
advantage of the Law of War, with the example being that of the enemy employing human 
shields to avoid military action by those who abide by the Law of War.). 
 30 Dungan, supra note 14, at 10 (―Intercepted Taliban communications, captured docu-
ments, and interviews with jailhouse informants at theater-level facilities confirm that it has 
become Taliban standard operating procedure to claim abuse every time a detainee moves 
from one facility to the next. Usually, the claim is leveled during initial in-processing into the 
field detention site or SOTF detention facility, either during the initial medical examination 
or during the first interrogation.‖). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 13 (―When allegations of detainee abuse or violations of the rules of engagement, 
or ROE, enter the OPCEN, the reputation and combat effectiveness of the task force are on 
the line.‖). 
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terms of using tactical lawfare to achieve the same results normally reserved 
for traditional battlefield or diplomatic victories. This includes the ―paralyz-
ing‖ of international intelligence services, releasing captured accused terror 
operatives back into the fight, altering military operations, opting for tar-
geted killings to avoid having to capture, and loss of ―operational momen-
tum.‖34 
B.  Faux Torture 
But what about these torture claims? Certainly a significant number 
are valid and have merit.35 However, the al-Qaeda tactic appears to take a 
cumulative approach for maximum impact. This means that many torture 
claims may not necessarily have merit.36 One example is former GTMO 
prisoner named Muhammad Saad Iqbal Madni. This Pakistani national de-
tailed extremely provocative claims of abuse to his Pakistani advocate as 
part of lawsuit against the U.K. and Pakistani governments.37 
Talking about the nature and degree of torture (Madni) alleges that 
he was subjected to the third degree torture that included electric shocks to 
the body, particularly the knees, kicks and slapping, falling tap water on the 
head while blind-folded and hooded, a six month spell in a steel box mea-
suring 6x4 feet in total nudity in extreme temperatures that could be abso-
lutely chilling or humid. Was also kept hungry and thirsty.38 
Madni‘s claims were certainly compelling. But the question remains 
as to whether his provocative torture claims are true or if the claims were 
merely part of a legal strategy in his effort to exert pressure on the Pakistani 
and U.K. Governments to press for the release of al-Qaeda suspects remain-
ing in GTMO. There is precedent for this tactic as other lawsuits filed by 
family members of GTMO detainees within the Pakistani High Court work 
  
 34 DeYoung, supra note 26, at 1; Dunn, supra note 3, at 2; A DIA study reported that 14 
percent of former GTMO detainees were confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorism. 
DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, FACT SHEET: FORMER GUANTANAMO DETAINEE TERRORISM 
TRENDS (2009). 
 35 The government also has acknowledged waterboarding purported 9/11 mastermind 
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and also top al-Qaeda associate Abu Zabaydah. See also Ali et al 
v. Rumsfeld, Nos. 07–5178, 07–5185, 07–5186, 07–5187 (C.A.D.C. May 6, 2010) (Lawsuit 
on behalf of various former GTMO detainees was dismissed due to lack of standing and 
immunity of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, but the court acknowledged that it 
believed torture had been conducted). See also Morris D. Davis, Historical Perspective on 
Guantanamo Bay: The Arrival of the High Value Detainees, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 
115, n.3 (2009). 
 36 Dungan supra note 14, at 10. 
 37 Syed M. Aslam, Freed Gitmo Inmate Narrates Horrific Plight, MAKEPAKISTANBETTER. 
COM (last visited Sept. 25, 2010), http://makepakistanbetter.com/why_how_what_forum_full. 
asp?ArticleID=10096&GroupID=5&Group_title=Pakistan; see also Madni v. Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Royal Courts of Justice (2009). 
 38 Madni, supra note 37. 
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to achieve the same goal.39 For example, the wife of GTMO detainee Saiful-
lah Paracha successfully convinced the High Court into forcing the Pakista-
ni Government into providing quarterly reports on its progress of pushing 
for the release of Pakistani detainees.40 The lawsuit also forced the Pakistani 
Government to compensate families of GTMO detainees.41 In her highly 
publicized lawsuit, the wife also invoked claims that Paracha was subjected 
to harsh treatment despite the fact that unclassified evidence suggests that 
Paracha has been consistently treated well.42 Regardless, in 2010, the Pakis-
tani Government was deemed by the court to be in contempt for failing to 
adequately press for the release of Pakistani citizens that were detained at 
GTMO.43 
But again, the question remains as to the veracity of these torture 
claims. In his lawsuit, Madni invokes very detailed instances of torture and 
mistreatment.44 His advocate even states that ―he was incarcerated near the 
cages that Khalid Shaikh Muhammad, Saifullah Paracha, Dr. Ammar Ba-
louch, an ex-husband of Dr. Afia Siddiqui, Majid Khan, Ghulam Rabbani 
and Ghulam Raheem Rabbani, brothers who belong to Karachi was kept in 
Guantanamo Bay.‖45 Madni then went on to quote the doctors, whom he 
claims stated that the detainees were viewed as the enemy.46 
The problem with Madni‘s story is that his account—widely publi-
cized in Pakistan—is not true. A tour through the various camps at GTMO 
revealed that none of the prisoners were kept in cages.47 In fact, the cages 
were limited to a brief timeframe in 2002 that were highlighted in the 
aforementioned leaked photos. Most of the names Madni invoked had not 
  
 39 Paracha v. Federation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, (2003) Const. P. 926/2003 (D.B.) 
Principal Seat Karachi (Pak.). 
 40 Id.; See also SHC Directs Constitution of Medical Board: Medical treatment of Guan-
tanamo Bay Detainee‟s Wife, APNAKARACHI.COM (Jun. 2, 2010), http://www.apnakarachi. 
com/SHC-directs-constitution-of-medical-board.html. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See also SAIFULLA PARACHA DETAINEE 1094 TAKE ACTION!!!!, FREEPARACHAS.ORG 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080219151328/http://www.freeparachas.org/ (accessed by  
searching for www.freeparachas.org in the Internet Archive index). . This Web site is run by 
the family of Saifullah and Uzair Paracha and mirrors many of the complaints found in the 
lawsuit. Most notable is that as of July 11, 2010, the Web site erroneously stated that Saiful-
lah Paracha ―has suffered 2 heart attacks due to extremely harsh interrogations and torture.‖ 
Unclassified documentation of FBI interviews with Saifullah Paracha reveal a less provoca-
tive picture of the situation. 
 43 Tariq Siddiqui, Remand Home shifted to Civil Defence building, DAWN (Pakistan), June 
2, 2010, available at http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn 
the-newspaper/local/remand-home-shifted-to-civil-defence-building-260. 
 44 Aslam, supra note 37; Madni, supra note 37. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Statement based on author‘s multiple tours to GTMO, as well as access gleaned from 
position as prosecutor with the Office of Military Commissions. 
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even been captured while the GTMO cages were briefly in use. Instead, 
these detainees live in climate-controlled cells that include beds and person-
al effects.48 In addition, detainees have significant access to recreation yards 
and classrooms, and many detainees live in a communal setting where they 
can roam and interact within the camp confines for most of the day.49 More-
over, unclassified records indicate that Paracha and the Rabbani brothers 
have always been in completely different camps than Muhammad, Khan, 
and Ammar—so called High-Value Detainees (HVD)—consequently mak-
ing it highly unlikely Madni was incarcerated amongst that select group of 
Pakistanis.50 And, as a non-HVD, Madni would not have been housed or 
granted access to that camp, which is separated from the rest.51 
C.  The Torture Benchmark 
Madni is not the only prisoner to make such detailed accounts of 
torture. Some claims of abuse by U.S. personnel have indeed been corrobo-
rated, while the veracity of others remains murky at best.52 But the effects of 
even claiming torture per the al-Qaeda manual guidance resulted in signifi-
cant legal and public relations victories for the terrorist organization and its 
supporters.53 In addition, significant time and resources are required to in-
vestigate and possibly fend off even the murkiest of mistreatment claims, 
which again constitute victories for al-Qaeda.54 In fact, these legal actions 
often are just as tactically successful in terms of disrupting intelligence op-
erations as more conventional battlefield or terror operations.55 At the same 
time, the tactical gains of this lawfare approach serve to spin the public 
  
 48 Brown, supra note 19, at 8–11 (Brown presents a detailed listing of GTMO amenities 
by camp.). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Andrew O. Selsky, AP: Military Confirms Secret Lockup for Top Detainees Inside 
Guantanamo, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 6, 2008, available at Westlaw2/6/08 AP Worldstream 
21:36:58 (The HVDs were placed in their own top secret camp upon arrival at GTMO and 
have been segregated from the rest of the detainee population. The HVD camp is so top 
secret that many top GTMO commanders are not told of its location and very few details 
have been released.). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Dungan, supra note 14, at 10; Al-Adahi, supra note 4, at *9 (The U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated under the context of torture claims, ―Put bluntly, the instructions to detainees 
are to make up a story and lie.‖); See also Davis, supra note 20, at 2 (GTMO detainee David 
Hicks, his family, and attorneys constantly blitzed the media on claims of torture and abuse. 
However, once his case was brought to a military commission, Hicks stipulated through his 
attorney that no mistreatment took place and also thanked U.S. service members for the way 
he was treated.). 
 53 Yin, supra note 2, at 879–83. 
 54 Id.; See generally ARMY REGULATION 15–6: INVESTIGATION INTO FBI ALLEGATIONS OF 
DETAINEE ABUSE AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA DETENTION FACILITY (June 9, 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2005/d20050714report.pdf. 
 55 Dunn, supra note 3, at 2. 
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backlash toward western governments as opposed to historic revulsion per-
taining to bloody terrorist attacks.56 And, all of the time and resources used 
to litigate the torture or mistreatment claims ultimately have caused a wear-
ing down on the American and British public, which in turn empowers al-
Qaeda and its allies to hang on and continue the fight.57 The tactical lawfare 
result also has proven to wear down individual military forces deployed to 
the battlefield at all levels of hierarchy due to the heightened oversight and 
seemingly never-ending investigatory process.58 As such, operational effi-
ciency and momentum in physically fighting against terrorist organizations 
is stunted.59 Much of this has been accomplished by ingratiating torture 
claims into virtually all legal proceedings regardless of validity, as the ex-
amples of Madni and Paracha demonstrate. 
Paul Rester is the director of GTMO‘s Joint Intelligence Group that 
oversees the detainee camps and its interrogators.60 Rester is a known advo-
cate for non-coercive interrogation techniques since assuming his position 
in 2006.61 Rester confirmed that two instances of excessive harsh treatment 
occurred at GTMO in the early days of the detainee camp.62 One of those 
instances related to a Saudi detainee named Mohamed al Qahtani, a man 
purported to be the 20th hijacker during the 9/11 attacks.63 Leaked informa-
tion and a subsequent investigation suggests that al Qahtani was forced into 
nudity, sleep deprived, faced a variety of verbal threats, and was even 
forced to succumb to enemas.64 
Al Qahtani made his claims of torture in 2005 around the time that 
he was charged within the military commissions system. What happened as 
a result was a significant legal victory for al Qahtani. Because of the torture 
allegations, Susan Crawford, the convening authority of the Military Com-
  
 56 Id. 
 57 But see Crabtree, supra note 11. 
 58 Dungan, supra note 14, at 10. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Terry Moran, Exclusive: Guantanamo‟s Chief Interrogator Says „We Don‟t Employ 
Torture‘ (ABC News television broadcast June 26, 2006), available at http://abcnews.go. 
com/Nightline/story?id=2123335&page=1. 
 61 Andrew O. Selsky, Gitmo Interrogator Describes Tactics, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 16, 
2008, available at Westlaw 2/16/08 APONLINELAMCARB 20:51:39. 
 62 Moran, supra note 60. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See generally Arthur J. Lachman, The Torture Memos and the Demands for Legality, in 
Volume XII, PLI‘S CALIFORNIA MCLE MARATHON 2009: LATEST ISSUES IN LEGAL ETHICS – 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE – ELIMINATION OF BIAS IN THE PROFESSION 107-123 (2009); See also 
Interrogation Log Detainee 063, available at http://www.time.com/time/2006/log/log.pdf 
(purportedly obtained by TIME Magazine from the Department of Defense). 
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missions, ordered that all charges be dropped against al Qahtani.65 The ra-
tionale was that his case was tainted beyond repair.66 In fact, Crawford spe-
cifically acknowledged that the harsh treatment of al Qahtani was to be con-
strued as ―torture.‖67 As such, despite strong evidence against al Qahtani, 
prospects for reintroducing charges against him languished well into the 
second decade of the 21st Century. 
This legal victory, coupled with the unrelated Abu Ghraib prisoner 
abuse scandal in Iraq, cascaded into the perception that GTMO was the 
home to countless similar activities.68 That perception in turn offers credi-
bility to al-Qaeda propaganda measures, as well as efforts by individuals 
such as Madni, to claim meritless torture in order to achieve their goals. In a 
news interview, Rester confirmed as much when he told the Associated 
Press that most of the stories of GTMO detainee abuse are directly derived 
from the success of al Qahtani and the other unnamed individual.69 
Upon being charged in a Military Commission, Muhammad Jawad, 
the Afghani charged with attacking the U.S. Army convoy when he was 
approximately seventeen years old, is another who described threats made 
against him, although his claims related to instances at the point of cap-
ture.70 The military judge in Jawad‘s case agreed to suppress admissions 
made to U.S. forces due to his treatment at the hands of Afghan troops prior 
to being turned over to U.S. custody.71 Jawad has since been released. Omar 
Khadr, fifteen at the time of capture, is another example of someone who 
detailed torture claims upon being charged in a Military Commission. 
Meanwhile, Uzair Paracha, the son of GTMO detainee Saifullah Paracha 
who was implicated in the same conspiracy as his father, initially coope-
rated with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to include making 
proffer statements and authorizing consent searches.72 But, upon the pros-
pect of a criminal conviction in federal court, Uzair claimed that he was 
mistreated by the FBI. Uzair was eventually convicted of terror-related 
charges and sentenced to thirty years in prison. Although Uzair‘s mistreat-
ment claims were rejected at the appellate level, Uzair‘s advocates in the 
United States and abroad continue to press for his release based on those 
  
 65 Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, at 
A01 (Crawford stated ―we tortured Qahtani. His treatment met the legal definition of torture 
and that‘s why I did not refer the case.‖). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 GTMO also became synonymous with waterboarding, despite the fact that the water-
boarding activity occurred elsewhere and specifically not at GTMO. 
 69 Selsky, supra note 61. 
 70 Jawad, supra note 7. 
 71 Id.; Carol Rosenberg, Young Afghan freed; spent 61/2 years at Guantánamo, MIAMI 
HERALD, August 24, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 16485195. 
 72 US v. Paracha, 2008 WL 2477392 (N.Y. 2008). 
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claims. A similar tactic was employed by Syed Hashmi, a U.S. citizen who 
in 2010 received fifteen years in prison for attempting to secure equipment 
for al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters. During a rant against U.S. foreign policy, 
Hashmi added—in what can almost be construed as an afterthought—the 
unsubstantiated notion that his pre-trial treatment was physically ―cruel.‖73 
D.  Legal Advice, Courtesy of al-Qaeda, Esq. 
The commonality of all of these claims is that they follow the ac-
cepted al-Qaeda manual for handling a trial.74 This manual has 18 chapters 
that range from waging terrorist attacks to enduring torture.75 Chapter 18 of 
the manual details a set list of rules.76 The chapters regarding custody opine 
that torture should be claimed no matter what.77  
Rule number one advises ―at the beginning of the trial, once more 
the brothers must insist on proving that torture was inflicted on them by the 
State Security [investigators] before the judge.‖78 The second rule is to 
―complain [to the court] of mistreatment while in prison.‖79 From there, the 
manual advises a litany of items, which include that the prisoner ―do his 
best to know the names of the state security officers, who participated in his 
torture and mention their names to the judge.‖80 
The tactic of seeking to identify state security officers is perhaps 
one of the savviest elements of the al-Qaeda handbook. This is because 
―outing‖ an intelligence officer is regarded as a major national intelligence 
concern and causes many sleepless nights within the intelligence communi-
ty.
81
 A secondary effect is that such identifications, or even allegations of 
  
 73 See Benjamin Weiser, Courtroom Tirade Offers Insight Into Mind of Would-Be Times 
Sq. Bomber, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2010, at A21. 
 74 See The al Qaeda Manual, supra note 1. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at Lesson 18. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 CIA Director Leon E. Panetta declared in 2010 that disclosure of such information 
would result in ―exceptionally grave damage to clandestine human intelligence collection 
and foreign liaison relationships.‖ American Civil Liberties Union v. Department of Defense 
et al, 2010 WL 308810 (S.D.N.Y.); see also NYC Judge Rejects Release of CIA Materials to 
ACLU, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 15, 2010, available at http://dailycaller.com/2010/07/15/ny-
judge-rejects-release-of-cia-materials-to-aclu/ ( ―Courts are not invested with the competence 
to second-guess the CIA director regarding the appropriateness of any particular intelligence 
source or method‖); Lesley Clark, Pentagon Allows Banned Reporter to Return to Guanta-
namo, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, July 8, 2010, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/07/08/97 
219/pentagon-allows-banned-reporter.html (JTF-GTMO also temporarily banned reporters 
from the base after they reported the names of certain interrogators that had been classified, 
even though those names were published elsewhere). 
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implication, cause significant embarrassment to a wide variety of govern-
ments.82 This has proven on numerous occasions to create division among 
allies in what has been known as the ―War on Terror.‖83 That division has in 
turn granted victories for the detainees and their supporters that exist well 
beyond mere legal procedure.84 In other words, it demonstrates how tactical 
lawfare can shape the battlefield for asymmetrical actors such as al-Qaeda. 
One example is the curious case of Mamdouh Habib. Habib is an 
Australian citizen who was born in Egypt.85 He was arrested in Pakistan on 
charges of assisting al-Qaeda in various activities, which include training 
for some of the 9/11 hijackers.86 Habib ultimately was sent to GTMO.87 
During the course of administrative proceedings, Habib claimed numerous 
graphic accounts of torture that he said occurred during overseas incarcera-
tion prior to finding himself in U.S. military custody.88 The most striking 
allegation charged that Australian and American personnel were on-hand 
during the torture.89 While certainly not a new allegation, Habib‘s allega-
tions stood out due to his level of detail relating to Australian intelligence 
officer involvement.90 Habib further initiated a row between the United 
States and Australia when he added that there also were individuals in-
volved with American accents.91  
Habib was ultimately released from GTMO, and Australia‘s attitude 
toward GTMO became irreparably damaged and likely became a precursor 
  
 82 Dominic Casciani & Steve Swann, Guantanamo Papers: The UK‟s Handling of Detai-
nees, BBC NEWS, July 15, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10641330 (In the United 
Kingdom, about 80 government lawyers sifted through more than 500,000 documents lo-
cated in a secure area in order to respond to lawsuits and inquiries relating to detainee issues 
in conjunction with the United States). 
 83 H.X.A. v. The Home Office, [2010] EWHC 1177 (QB). 
 84 Id. (The division among allies causes less participation and consequently less coordi-
nated manpower to be directed at specific targets or operations). 
 85 Habib v. Nationwide News Pty Ltd, [2010] NSWCA 34 (Austl.). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 See Declaration of Teresa A. McPalmer, Habib v. Bush, (No. 02-CV-1130); 
COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SUMMARY OF BASIS FOR 
TRIBUNAL DECISION (Sept. 27, 2004), available at http://wid.ap.org/documents/detainees/ 
mamdouhhabib.pdf#16. 
 89 Id.; see also Dana Priest, Terror Suspect Alleges Torture, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2005, at 
A1. 
 90 Documents Reveal Habib‟s Torture Allegations, ABC NEWS AUSTL., January 6, 2005, 
available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200501/s1277343.htm (last visited on 
Sept. 25, 2010) (―The Australian officials stood by while what we believe were CIA officials 
engaged in the type of abuses we‘ve seen at Abu Graib, where Mamdouh Habib‘s clothes 
were cut off, he‘s handcuffed, held down with women around him,‖ Habib‘s Australian 
attorney told the media. ―The photos were taken and he was mocked.‖). 
 91 Id., See also Dana Priest, Terror Suspect Alleges Torture, WASH POST at A1, Jan. 6, 
2005. 
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to a later military commissions case where Australia pressured U.S. officials 
into releasing another Australian terror suspect named David Hicks.92 Such 
―on-the-record‖ accusations also changed the nature of allied cooperation 
between the United States and the United Kingdom as U.K. officials began 
outright refusing to transfer terror suspects into U.S. custody out of fear that 
suspects would ―be subject to extraordinary rendition to Guantanamo Bay.‖ 
93Meanwhile, the allegations coming from Habib continued to endure well 
into 2010 as Habib became embroiled in a libel and defamation lawsuit over 
his statements. An Australian court initially found that Habib was exagge-
rating his torture claims. An appellate court later overturned the previous 
ruling.94 
The guidance pertaining to identifying these ―state security offic-
ers,‖ incidentally, also has resulted in a veritable cloak-and-dagger dynamic 
between detainee advocates and the intelligence community.95 Reports have 
quietly arisen of detainee advocates conducting their own investigations in 
order to glean the identities of the interrogators to use in both criminal trial 
and habeas corpus litigation.96 Because this tactic runs completely contrary 
to intelligence community policy, an environment of distrust was increa-
singly cultivated.97 In one instance, a JTF-GTMO attorney affiliated with 
  
 92 Raymond Bonner, Australian Terrorism Detainee Leaves Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Decem-
ber 29, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/29/world/asia/29hicks.html?_r= 
1&ref=david_hicks (Shortly after the publicized details of Habib‘s case, Australian Prime 
Minister John Howard began facing significant domestic pressure to push for the release of 
Hicks. Howard raised the issue directly with U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, and a plea 
bargain securing Hicks‘ repatriation quickly followed). 
 93 See generally H.X.A. v. The Home Office, [2010] EWHC 1177 (QB) (Court documents 
revealed that the U.K. government, in 2005, ceased all transfers of terror suspects to the 
United States until a memorandum of understanding could be reached whereas the detainees 
would be assured of humane treatment by the United States and specifically not transferred 
to GTMO). 
 94 See Habib v. Nationwide News Pty Ltd, [2010] NSWCA 34 (Austl.). 
 95 Peter Finn, Detainees Shown CIA Officers‟ Photos, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2009, at A1 
(detailing a federal investigation that began in 2009 relating to the ―John Adams Project.‖ 
This project involved researchers from the ACLU and National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers who conducted a private investigation into various covert and non-covert 
CIA personnel involved in detainee cases. The researchers reportedly managed to identify 
some of these covert personnel and took photographs of them. These photographs were then 
reportedly brought to GTMO via defense counsel and shown to the detainees); Charlie Sa-
vage, Inquiry Into Whether Detainees Were Shown Photos of C.I.A. Agents, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 21, 2009, at A20 (investigating reportedly included three military defense attorneys, 
who were read their rights prior to responding to the investigation). 
 96 Finn supra note 95; Savage supra note 95. See also Bill Gertz, Pentagon to Brief 2 
Lawmakers on CIA Risk, WASH. TIMES, April 12, 2010, at A1. 
 97 See generally Marc Thiessen, Investigating the John Adams Project — It‟s About Time, 
The Journal of the American Enterprise Institute, May 27, 2010, available at 
http://blog.american.com/?p=14632 (last visited Sept. 25, 2010) (For example, Rep. Jeff 
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the Center for Constitutional Rights, disclosed then-secret information and 
names to the advocacy group by containing the coded information within a 
Valentine‘s Day card.98 The boiling point may have occurred in 2010 when 
a Congressional budget committee proposed funding for investigating ethics 
violations that may have been committed by detainee defense counsel.99 A 
major factor for proposing this controversial policy was directly rooted in 
the alleged campaign to follow the al-Qaeda guidance on prisoners doing 
―his best to know the names of the state security officers.‖100 
Practically, however, from the government‘s perspective, it em-
ploys more traditional national security litigation techniques. In the Military 
Commissions, for example, government agencies, in conjunction with pros-
ecutors, frequently file what are known as Rule 505 motions specifically 
designed to protect the identity of the interrogators.101 This motion allows 
for the use of pseudonyms and other identity safeguards.102 In fact, Rule 505 
motions are the government‘s direct legal response to the lawfare tactic of 
trying to ―out‖ interrogator identities.103 Government justification relates to 
safety and liability concerns for the interrogators, as well as parallel national 
security protections.104 While Rule 505 is similar to its federal court coun-
terpart relating to national security protections, the military commissions 
structure of limiting discovery to material and exculpatory facts as opposed 
to typical open discovery does offer some increased leeway in protecting 
interrogator identities as well as national security.105 This is in part because 
it prevents discovery from going off on needless tangents while limiting 
―fishing expeditions‖ relating to the discovery process.106 Meanwhile, other 
countries, such as the United Kingdom, are beginning to develop a system 
  
Miller (R-FL) referred to the alleged John Adams Project activities as ―devious‖ and ―illeg-
al.‖ Meanwhile, others decried efforts to investigate as ―McCarthyite‖). 
 98 U.S. v. Diaz, No. 09-0535/NA (C.A.A.F. 2010), available at http://www.armfor. 
uscourts.gov/opinions/2009SepTerm/09-0535.pdf (upholding conviction of a Navy Lt. 
Commander who used his staff attorney position to reveal names of all detainees being held 
at GTMO). 
 99 Charlie Savage, Bill Puts Scrutiny on Detainees‟ Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2010, 
at A19 (propose a bill to direct the Pentagon‘s Inspector General to investigate suspected 
misconduct of detainee defense attorneys). 
100 See The Al Qaeda Manual at 176–80, supra note 1. 
101 MIL. COMM‘N. R. EVID. 505. 
102 Id. 
103 Id.; See also Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. App. III, § 1-16 (2010) 
(the statutory equivalent of MIL. COMM‘N. R. EVID. 505). 
104 MIL. COMM‘N. R. EVID. 505; Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. App. III, 
§ 1-16 (2010). 
105 See U.S. DEP‘T. OF DEF., supra note 15. 
106 Id. 
File: Lebowitz 2 Created on: 1/9/2011 9:48:00 PM Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:09:00 PM 
2010] THE VALUE OF CLAIMING TORTURE 373 
where they address the mistreatment allegations while further protecting the 
source of the evidence.107 
The al-Qaeda guidebook continues with items such as rule number 
six, which includes established Western court items such as ―during the 
trial, the court has to be notified of any mistreatment of the brothers inside 
the prison.‖108 The practical approach of this al-Qaeda guidance is that de-
tainees with legitimate claims of torture will have a step-by-step instruction 
into ensuring their claims are properly addressed in court.109 At a minimum, 
the guidebook authors were savvy enough in their tactical lawfare strategy 
to note that valuable time and resources will be committed toward investi-
gating claims of mistreatment, which certainly become cumulative in terms 
of strategic impact.110 So, the tactic of claiming torture in all cases regard-
less of merit has developed into a formidable tactical lawfare strategy due to 
the tactical inhibitions imposed onto various intelligence services and mili-
tary means at all levels of operation.111 
The al Qahtani case is a prime example of how the contents of the 
manual reaped dividends in a legitimate torture issue. Once al Qahtani was 
charged and afforded defense counsel, the torture complaints were investi-
gated and filed in extensive detail and he ultimately prevailed in court.112 
And for other detainees with more murky claims, chapter 17 of the manual 
suggests that detainees ―give torture examples from Egypt, Syria, Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia and all other Arab countries‖ where torture is notoriously 
brutal.113 The allegations on behalf of Paracha and Madni, as well as Ahmed 
Abu Omar Ali, are examples of these stereotypical claims.114 
Another example is that of Ahmed Ould Abdel Aziz, a Mauritanian 
citizen accused by the United States of fighting for the Taliban and al-
Qaeda.115 According to JTF-GTMO logs, Abdel Aziz levied claims of ―ex-
cessive use of force.‖116 However, GTMO medical records and logs are 
exceptionally detailed, even for those related to such valid torture victims as 
  
107 See Richard Norton-Taylor et al., Government to Compensate Torture Victims as Offi-
cial Inquiry Launched, THE GUARDIAN, July 6, 2010, at 1(noting that in July 2010, the re-
cently elected British Prime Minister David Cameron announced a plan that would initiate an 
official judicial inquiry into the torture claims via secure judicial officers while at the same 
time preventing the disclosure of vital intelligence assets). 
108 See The Al Qaeda Manual at 176–80, supra note 1, at Lesson 18. 
109 Id. 
110 See Yin, supra note 2, at 881–82. 
111 See Dungan, supra note 14, at 10. 
112 See ARMY REGULATION 15–6, supra note 54. 
113 See The Al Qaeda Manual, supra note 1, Lesson 17. 
114 See Paracha, supra note 8; Abu Ali, supra note 8, at 232-40; Madni, supra note 37. 
115 CSRT Record of Proceedings, Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision, (Nov. 1, 2004). 
116 GTMO records for ISN 757, WEBCITATION.ORG, at 8, http://www.webcitation.org/ 
query?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.defenselink.mil%2Fpubs%2Fpdfs%2FApp4.pdf&date=2
009-06-01 (last visited Sept. 25, 2010). 
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al Qahtani.117 Medical issues and complaints are often recorded on a daily 
and sometimes hourly basis.118 In addition, these records have always been 
discoverable during military commissions proceedings and investigations. 
When the only ―proof‖ of torture that Abdel Aziz could muster was a ban-
dage on his thigh, an investigation determined that the claims were ―unsubs-
tantiated.‖119 Subsequent claims of torture against Abdel Aziz were also 
investigated and debunked, which is in stark contrast to al Qahtani‘s inves-
tigation and confirmation of mistreatment. 
The success of al Qahtani, as well as the knowledge of waterboard-
ing activities, perpetuated a significant effort to cloud all relevant legal pro-
ceedings with torture claims.120 This effort was not limited to al-Qaeda 
operatives, but also humanitarian advocates and defense attorneys who 
would advise their clients to make such torture claims as a practical matter. 
Soon, documents similar to portions of the Manchester Manual were pop-
ping up inside detainee cells.121 One of the more overt examples includes an 
Amnesty International brochure that was covertly hidden from screeners by 
being included among protected attorney-client correspondence.122 That 
brochure included the Camp X-Ray photos and essentially directed detai-
nees to claim torture due to the brochure‘s assertion that Americans were 
waging a torture campaign against Muslims.123 Such instances then led to 
additional legal battles relating to the attorneys who assisted in distributing 
contraband brochures or violating secrecy orders, which further highlighted 
the torture issue while also providing an additional battlefront over the 
rights to counsel.124 
  
117 See Id.  
118 See Id. 
119 Id. at 7. 
120 See Selsky, supra note 61. 
121 See Debra Burlingame & Thomas Joscelyn, Gitmo‟s Indefensible Lawyers, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 15, 2010, , at A23 (discussing that interviews conducted with JTF-GTMO personnel 
revealed similar concerns; at GTMO, attorney-client privilege is respected and consequently, 
legal material that is brought into such attorney-client meetings is not reviewed by outside 
personnel); See DEP‘T OF DEF., CAMP DELTA STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES, sec. II – 
Operations, 24-6, at 13.1 (2003).(distinguishing legal mail from other forms of mail); Jane 
Sutton, Mystery Underwear Stymies Guantanamo Investigators, REUTERS,Oct. 18, 2007, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSNASUA170120071018 (discussing another 
investigation revolving around detainee legal counsel related to smuggled underwear and 
swimsuits, which elicited some snickers but also concern relating to potential use as means 
for committing suicide). 
122 Burlingame & Joscelyn, supra note 121. 
123 Id. 
124 See Diaz, supra note 98, at 5–7. 
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III.  MILITARY COMMISSIONS CIRCA 2010 
When Obama was sworn in as President in January 2009, the efforts 
to prosecute accused terrorists were at a crossroads. The Detainee Treatment 
Act had already become law, consequently limiting detainee interrogations 
and treatment to the relatively benign articulation of the U.S. Army Field 
Manual.125 This means waterboarding was officially illegal, as was anything 
even close to resembling the treatment described and later confirmed to 
have been committed against al Qahtani.126 But, debate continued to rage 
over the proper venue to prosecute what was then referred to as unlawful 
enemy combatants. Many in the U.S. Government preferred to use the fed-
eral justice system to prosecute these detainees. They cited numerous suc-
cesses in gaining convictions. Others argued that the military commissions 
were the proper venue, often citing the fact that military commissions have 
been used in war crimes cases since the American Revolution, and virtually 
all major wars since.127 An important compromise was enacted in October 
2009, when the Military Commissions Act was revised.128 The 2009 version 
was lauded in many circles for specifically banning the courtroom use of 
virtually any information gleaned from torture, while still permitting the 
venue to proceed.129 In that manner, government officials such as Attorney 
  
125 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 10 U.S.C. § 801-1002(a) (2005) [hereinafter DTA] 
(stating that ―no person in the custody or under the effective control of the Department of 
Defense or under detention in a Department of Defense facility shall be subject to any treat-
ment or technique of interrogation not authorized by and listed in the United States Army 
Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation.‖); see also Provision of Military Commissions 
Act of 2006, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2) (serving to make the Detainee Treatment Act the exclu-
sive ―action‖ for alien detainees, who have been determined to have been properly detained 
as enemy combatants or are awaiting such determination, does not abridge remedial powers 
of the Court of Appeals); Belbacha v. Bush 520 F.3d 452, 454–56 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied, 552 U.S. 1033 (2007). 
126 See DTA, supra note 125. 
127 See Marguerite Feitlowitz, Introduction to Prosecuting Al Qaeda: September 11 and its 
Aftermath, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT (Dec. 26, 2001), http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/ 
alqaeda-intro.html (stating that military commissions have been used by numerous presi-
dents, to include George Washington, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. 
Roosevelt). 
128 See Military Commissions Act of 2009, supra note 15. 
129 See Warren Richey, Obama Endorses Military Commissions for Guantanamo Detai-
nees, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 29, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2009/ 
1029/p02s01-usju.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2010); see also David Frakt, New Manual for 
Military Commissions Disregards Commander-in-Chief, Congressional Intent and the Laws 
of War, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 29, 2010, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
david-frakt/new-manual-for-military-c_b_557720.html (Frakt, a former lead defense counsel 
in the military commissions system, acknowledges that ―on the whole, the 2009 MCA is 
substantially fairer than the 2006 version of the law and the new Manual also contains some 
significant improvement over the previous version. The standards for admissibility of 
coerced statements and hearsay evidence, for example, now are much closer to the standards 
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General Eric Holder could initiate the prosecution of detainees accused of 
participation in the 9/11 attacks. Meanwhile, it would also allow a military 
commission to convene in the prosecution of more classic alleged war crim-
inals such as Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, a detainee accused of masterminding 
the deadly 2000 maritime attack on the U.S.S. Cole.130 
A.  Reconciling the National Security Dynamic with Legal Proceedings 
Although the general phrase of ―protecting national security assets‖ 
is often cited as the justification for having military commissions, the true 
and related utility is providing a venue that permits the use of unwarned, un-
Mirandized statements.131 This means that intelligence agencies, such as the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), can use interrogations to glean informa-
tion relating to terrorist cells and infrastructure. These interrogation state-
ments can then be theoretically introduced for both inculpatory and exculpa-
tory use in a military commission prosecution.132 Agencies such as the CIA 
and NSA are historically intelligence-gathering organizations, as opposed to 
law enforcement groups such as the FBI and the Criminal Investigation 
Task Force (CITF). As a result, the military commissions process allows the 
CIA to focus on national security while not voiding the prospects of seeking 
a conviction in either federal court or via military commission. A successful 
example in terms of intelligence value and necessity is the immediate inter-
rogation of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, which open source information 
reveals led to the capture and ultimate federal court convictions of Iyman 
Faris (relating to a plot against New York City bridges), Jose Padilla (pur-
ported ―dirty bomber‖), Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri (purported al-Qaeda 
sleeper agent), and Uzair Paracha, as well as the detention and pending mili-
tary commission trials of Majid Khan (accused of plotting to attack U.S. gas 
stations), and Saifullah Paracha.133 
  
which apply in general courts-martial and federal court.‖ However, Frakt states that there are 
―some very troubling language in the new Manual relating to the proof required to convict 
for certain offenses, which undermines the Obama Administration‘s claims of respect for the 
law of war and adherence to the rule of law.‖). 
130 See U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., MILITARY COMMISSIONS, ABD AL-RAHIM AL-NASHIRI, available 
at http://www.defense.gov/news/commissionsalnashiri.html (select ―sworn charges‖) (last  
visited Sept. 25, 2010). 
131 See U.S. DEP‘T. OF DEF., supra note 15 at M.C.R.E. 304(a)(4). 
132 Id. 
133 Phil Hirschkorn, Lawyer: Detained Pakistani to Face Terrorism Charges, CNN.COM, 
Aug. 6, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/08/04/alqaeda.suspect/ (discussing how the 
interrogation of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad lead to the arrest of Uzair Paracha, Ali Saleh 
Kahlah al-Marri, Majid Khan, and Saifullah Paracha); see also Thomas Joscelyn, KSM‟s 
Sleeper Agents Posed a Serious Threat, WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM (Sept. 11, 2009), 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/016/937zmvqs.asp 
(discussing the many individuals named by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as being involved in 
al Qaeda attacks in the United States). 
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With the fixes and modifications to the military commissions rules 
and mandate, these statements are only permitted for prosecution so long as 
the circumstances of the treatment adhered to the U.S. Army Field Ma-
nual.134 As a result, Muhammad‘s statements would now not be admissible 
because they were tainted by waterboarding. Muhammad‘s statements were 
not used in the aforementioned legal proceedings.135 But, with the rules 
enacted since 2005, any non-tainted information can be elicited for intelli-
gence value and military commissions prosecution.136 This follows in line 
with the military commissions structure where only information that is ma-
terial, helpful or exculpatory to the defense is discoverable.137 That is in 
contrast to traditional open discovery rules relating to providing opposing 
counsel with anything that is relevant. Therefore, discovery does not need to 
go off on a tangent, which protects extraneous national security assets. The 
military commissions then can proceed with its additional protections of 
―national security assets‖ as prescribed in the rules.  
B.  Tackling Torture Issue through Improved Military Commissions 
Act 
The Rules for Military Commissions, which were approved by Sec-
retary of Defense Robert Gates in April 2010, provide guidelines for what 
statements can be used during legal proceedings.138 As mentioned above, 
anything gleaned contrary to the Army Field Manual is not admissible by 
the government.139 Instead, the rules mandate that admissible statements be 
  
134 See 42 U.S.C § 801(a) (―In general. No person in the custody or under the effective 
control of the Department of Defense or under detention in a Department of Defense facility 
shall be subject to any treatment or technique of interrogation not authorized by and listed in 
the United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation.‖); see also Belbacha v. 
Bush, 520 F.3d 458–459 (discussing the DTA‘s ability to limit the court‘s jurisdiction). 
135 See 42 U.S.C § 801(a) (―In general. No person in the custody or under the effective 
control of the Department of Defense or under detention in a Department of Defense facility 
shall be subject to any treatment or technique of interrogation not authorized by and listed in 
the United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation.‖); see also Belbacha, 520 
F.3d at 458–459 (discussing the DTA‘s ability to limit the court‘s jurisdiction); see also 
Gregory S. McNeal, A Cup of Coffee after the Waterboard: Seemingly Voluntary Post-Abuse 
Statements, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 943, 976 (2010) (discussing that statements found to be 
involuntarily derived under torture are not admissible in court). 
136 McNeal, supra note 135, at 976 (stating that any statement obtained through torture 
after the enactment of the DTA in 2005 is inadmissible); see also United States v. Ghailani, 
No. S10 98 Crim. 1023(LAK), 2010 WL 2756546, at *16-17 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2010) (hold-
ing that 6th Amendment rights were not violated against a former GTMO detainee because 
the CIA and law enforcement had a national security interest in engaging in custodial inter-
rogations over the course of several years). 
137 U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., supra note 15, at M.C.R.E. 701. 
138 Id. 
139 See 42 U.S.C § 801(a) (―In general. No person in the custody or under the effective 
control of the Department of Defense or under detention in a Department of Defense facility 
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deemed ―voluntary.‖140 Since Miranda warnings and signed consent state-
ments are often replaced with uncomfortable rooms and shackles during 
intelligence interrogations, the rules go on to discern what may be consti-
tuted as ―voluntary statements.‖141 For example, age, education, and other-
wise sophistication are listed as circumstances to be taken into account un-
der the totality of the circumstances when assessing the voluntariness of a 
statement.142 Circumstances surrounding the taking of the statement also are 
taken into account, as well as lapse of time and location between the state-
ments sought for admission and any prior questioning.143 Was the individual 
coerced in any way? Did the interrogator cross the line in terms of decep-
tiveness? All of these items are taken into account under the rules.144 This 
means that Jawad, who was about seventeen at the time of his interroga-
tions, or Khadr, who was fifteen, may have a stronger case of making invo-
luntary statements than someone such as Saifullah Paracha who was in his 
fifties, highly educated, and westernized. An additional result of this some-
what innocuous ―voluntary statement‖ guidance is that it likely will be con-
tested in virtually every non-speedy trial military commission case. 
But perhaps the most prominent change between the initial military 
commissions rules and the 2010 revision relates specifically to claims of 
torture.145 The old version prohibited the admission of torture-derived 
statements.146 That antiquated version simply mandated that ―[a] statement 
obtained by use of torture shall not be admitted into evidence against any 
party or witness.‖147 However, that prohibition was often maligned because 
many legal and political minds contended that activities such as waterboard-
ing were not necessarily ―torture.‖148 Instead, methods such as waterboard-
  
shall be subject to any treatment or technique of interrogation not authorized by and listed in 
the United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation.‖); see also Belbacha v. 
Bush, 520 F.3d at 458–459 (discussing the DTA‘s ability to limit the court‘s jurisdiction). 




144 See generally U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., supra note 15, at M.C.R.E. 304. 
145 See Habib v. Nationwide News Pty Ltd, [2010] NSWCA 34 (Austl.) (discussing 
admissibility of testimony made under torture). 
146 DEP‘T U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS 2006 at M.C.R.E. 
304(a)(3). 
147 Id. 
148 See generally Ashcroft Defends Waterboarding Before House Panel, CNN.COM, July 
17, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/07/17/ashcroft.waterboarding/ (Former  
Attorney General John Ashcroft told Congress that ―I believe a report of waterboarding 
would be serious, but I do not believe it would define torture.‖); see also Memorandum from 
Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att‘y Gen., U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel on Inter-
rogation of al Qaeda Operative for John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel of the Cent. Intelligence 
Agency (Aug. 1, 2002) available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-bybee2002.pdf 
(concluding that many interrogation methods do not constitute torture); see also Katherine 
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ing, extreme sleep deprivation activities, and excessive temperature changes 
were officially referred to under the innocuous term ―enhanced interrogation 
techniques,‖ with the acronym EIT.149 The differentiation between EITs and 
unquestionable torture became confused and intertwined.150 Citing early 
Bush-era memos defending EITs, opponents of the military commissions 
frequently attacked the military commissions rules as illegitimate and con-
doning of these EITs, since an argument could theoretically be made against 
what exactly constituted torture. This argument persisted and further tar-
nished the image of the military commissions as a fair and transparent form 
of justice. At the same time, the innocuous language of the earlier rules af-
forded organizations ranging from al-Qaeda to Amnesty International to 
maintain the focus on torture. 
In an effort to combat this line of attack, the Obama administration 
ordered that new military commissions cases be halted until the rules could 
be modified.151 As a result, the 2010 rules offered a much more specific 
manifestation.152 MCRE 304(a)(1) was refined with the title ―Exclusion of 
Statements Obtained by Torture or Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treat-
ment.‖153 The modified rule went on to mandate that ―[no] statement, ob-
tained by the use of torture, or by cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment (as 
defined by section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 
2000dd)), whether or not under color of law, shall be admissible in a trial by 
military commission.‖154 For the first time, the rules squarely defined the 
parameters of ―torture,‖ with the Detainee Treatment Act serving as the 
benchmark.155 This simple change caused frequent critics of the military 
commissions to acknowledge, grudgingly, the improved nature of the 
rules.156 
The 2010 rules also became more specific in other ways. For exam-
ple, the old rules had a general prohibition against statements made by the 
  
Gallagher, Universal Jurisdiction in Practice: Efforts to Hold Donald Rumsfeld and Other 
High-Level United States Officials Accountable for Torture, 7 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 1087, 
1087 (2008) (describing how U.S. government memos offer legal support for various inter-
rogation techniques, including waterboarding).  
149 Gallagher, supra note 148, at 1094 (referring to enhanced interrogation techniques as 
―EIT‖).  
150 See Yin supra note 2 (offering different classifications of torture). 
151 Peter Finn, Obama Seeks Halt to Legal Proceedings at Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Jan. 
21, 2009. 
152 DEP‘T OF DEF., supra note 15. 
153 Id. at pt. III, M.C.R.E. § 304(a)(1). 
154 Id. 
155 Compare id. (defining torture within the parameters of the Detainee Treatment Act), 
with DEP‘T OF DEF., supra note 15,at § 304(a)(1) (2007) (offering a definition of torture that 
is vastly less specific). 
156 See Frakt, supra note 129. 
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accused derived from coercion.157 The 2010 version of MCRE 304(a)(2) 
now relates to ―other statements of the accused‖ and mandates that ―[a] 
statement of the accused may be admitted in evidence in a military commis-
sion only if the military judge finds that the totality of the circumstances 
renders the statement reliable and possessing sufficient probative value . . . 
and that the statement was made incident to lawful conduct during military 
operations at the point of capture or during closely related active combat 
engagement, and the interests of justice would best be served by admission 
of the statement into evidence; or the statement was voluntarily given.‖158 
The genesis of this modification may very well be rooted in the above-
mentioned Jawad case. In that case, Jawad successfully argued for the sup-
pression of his statements because they were made shortly after he was pur-
portedly threatened by Afghan forces prior to being turned over to U.S. cus-
tody.159 The old rules were far from clear and left the door open for confu-
sion and inconsistency among various judges. In contrast, the 2010 rules are 
written in a more understandable and detailed manner that is closer to tradi-
tional military courts-martial and civilian legal code. 
The 2010 update to MCRE 304(a)(3) offers similar changes when it 
comes to ―statements from persons other than the accused.‖160 This update 
also defines torture under the guidance of the Detainee Treatment Act.161 
The practical effect of this element is that EITs such as waterboarding, that 
may previously have been in dispute as to whether or not they constituted 
legal torture, were outright prohibited from use against a different detai-
nee.162 This means that confessions elicited from accused 9/11 mastermind 
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad via waterboarding would unquestioningly be 
prohibited for use against Muhammad‘s alleged co-conspirators.163 
However, while the 2010 changes provide much more detailed 
guidance when it comes to statements of the accused and persons other than 
the accused, the rules do not completely close the door on statements from 
such EIT recipients as Muhammad.164 If the government so chooses, it can 
still make a compelling argument for the admission of statements obtained 
years after the EIT process ceased.165 The government could conceivably 
  
157 See DEP‘T OF DEF., supra note 15. 
158 DEP‘T OF DEF., supra note 15, at M.C.R.E. § 304(a)(2). 
159 Ruling on Def. Mot. To Suppress, at 1–3, United States v. Jawad (No. 08-004), availa-
ble at http://www.defense.gov/news/commissionsJawad.html. 
160 DEP‘T OF DEF., supra note 15, at M.C.R.E. § 304(a)(3). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 McNeal, supra note 135, at 977–78. 
164 See generally DEP‘T OF DEF., supra note 15. 
165 See United States v. Ghailani, 2010 WL 1839030, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2010) (de-
nying a suppression motion on the grounds that Ghailani‘s treatment by the CIA bore no 
logical relationship to his prosecution, particularly since the prosecutors had rejected the use 
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argue that statements made to the FBI, CITF, or military investigators were 
voluntary after the Detainee Treatment Act went into effect in 2005. This is 
because many of the detainees had legal counsel by this time. Individuals 
such as Muhammad would also fit the definition of an educated, older de-
tainee.166 In addition, detainees such as Muhammad—or KSM as he is 
known in the intelligence and law enforcement community—were no longer 
forced to cooperate.167 Instead, waterboarding and other varying forms of 
EITs were replaced with what some insiders referred to as ―cookieboard-
ing.‖168 Rewards such as additional food, treats, entertainment, recreation, 
and increased freedom to interact with fellow detainees were granted to 
those who were deemed cooperative.169 This means that a detainee desiring 
to eat a specialty New York style cheesecake or have an opportunity to play 
numerous soccer games with fellow detainees would first need to behave 
themselves and play ball with their questioners. Those who would not coo-
perate with their questioners would merely live in a more austere environ-
ment. 
As such, many of these post-2005 statements continue to be record-
ed in what the FBI refers to as Letterhead Memorandums (LHMs). These 
LHMs are summarizations of the interrogations and, in the context of Guan-
tanamo Bay detainees, specifically relate to unwarned but otherwise volun-
tary interview sessions.170 In many cases, the detainee will cut an interview 
short due to health concerns or general ―not feeling up to it.‖171 LHMs differ 
from some of the early classified CIA summaries that delve into statements 
made under EIT conditions. It should, however, be noted that countless CIA 
interrogations since 2001 were conducted under the same degree of un-
provocative and/or ―cookie boarding‖ tactics as the FBI, CITF, and military 
  
of any statements by Ghailani from after his capture). A similar approach can be applied in a 
military commission. 
166 Muhammed is in his late 40s and received a college degree from North Carolina A&T 
State University. Muhammad also experienced a brief period in a local North Carolina jail 
relating to a car accident. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed‟s Isolated U.S. College Days, Dina 
Temple-Raston (Nat‘l Pub. Radio broadcast Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/ 
story/story.php?storyId=120516152. 
167 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 10 U.S.C.A. § 801 (West 2010). 
168 One publicized early example from 2001 relates to that of al Qaeda operative Abu Jan-
dal who reportedly offered up a wealth of information relating to the 9/11 attacks after nearly 
a year of antagonistic failure to cooperate. Jandal, a diabetic, reportedly opened up after 
guards provided him with sugar-free cookies as an incentive item. The interrogator who used 
the cookieboarding approach has become a harsh critic of the pre-DTA Bush-era interroga-
tion practices. See Bobby Ghosh, After Waterboarding: How to Make Terrorists Talk?, TIME, 
June 8, 2009, at 41, 41. 
169 Id.; The author also has reviewed countless GTMO interrogation reports that detail the 
sheer amount of rewards offered, accepted and refused by detainees. 
170 The author has sifted through countless LHMs during the trial preparation phase of 
cases held at GTMO. The content of many LHMs remain classified. 
171 Id.  
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investigations, although most of the CIA summaries remain classified due to 
national security protections.172 So, in theory, these untainted statements, 
particularly LHMs, could be classified as voluntary depending on the so-
phistication of the detainee along with other tangible circumstances. From a 
practical point of view, the defense would still likely be able to seek the 
introduction of earlier mistreatment in order to diminish the effects of the 
later statements, but again, in theory, the LHMs could very well be consi-
dered ―voluntary‖ and consequently admissible under the 2010 rules. 
Moreover, individuals, such as Muhammad, admitted under oath to 
various war crimes during the yearly Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
(CSRT).173 These are administrative proceedings that are designed to deter-
mine whether a detainee should continue to be classified as an ―enemy 
combatant,‖ a term that was changed in the MCA 2009 to ―unprivileged 
enemy belligerent‖ and the legal basis for jurisdiction to hold a non-citizen 
in detention.174 An argument can certainly be made that these admissions 
were voluntary because they were made under both the CSRT oath and an 
Islamic oath.175 In addition, attendance or participation in a CSRT is volun-
tary, with a personal representative assigned to assist the detainee if de-
sired.176 Checklists and a script specifically inform the detainee that he is 
not required to attend, but certainly may do so if desired. Detainees also are 
asked if they want to make a statement.177 Muhammad, for example, pre-
pared a pre-arranged statement that refuted some assertions but corroborated 
others.178 For example, Muhammad admitted to his role in 9/11, as well as 
other terrorist plots, while also asserting that he was not the leader of al-
Qaeda‘s Military Committee as had been alleged at one time.179 So, again, 
while the defense would likely seek to muddy the waters by introducing 
previous EIT treatment to show how it correlates to the CSRT admission, 
that statement also would in theory be deemed admissible as voluntary. 
  
172 An in-depth article in the New York Times revealed that more than two-thirds of all 
CIA interrogations conducted in the few years after 9/11 involved no element of coercion. 
See Scott Shane, Inside a 9/11 Mastermind‟s Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2008, at 
A1. 
173 Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024 17–
20 (Mar. 10, 2007), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/transcript_isn10024.pdf. 
174 Davis, supra note 20. 
175 McNeal, supra note 135, at 977 (discussing the totality of the circumstances test as an 
analytical framework for determining the voluntariness of the statements). 
176 Davis, supra note 20; see also Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing 
for ISN 10024, supra note 173. 
177 See also Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024, supra 
note 173 (providing details of the CSRT Hearing). 
178 Id. 
179 Id. (Muhammad maintained that he was in fact the head of al-Qaeda‘s Media Commit-
tee, as well as head of the terror organization‘s anthrax program.). 
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Despite the political affirmation of military commissions, the 
process was still under the same torture claim attack in both legal and media 
venues, with voluntariness of statements front and center. The first major 
military commissions hearings to take place in 2010 revolved around de-
fense efforts to suppress detainee statements due to alleged torture or other-
wise harsh treatment.180 Interrogators were called to the stand where they 
relayed, among other items, witness testimony that the detainee, who was 
seriously injured in the 2002 firefight that led to his capture, was shackled 
to a hospital bed while being interrogated.181 As a result, numerous advoca-
cy and legal groups were provided additional ammunition to continue their 
torture arguments.  
Moreover, the torture and mistreatment argument was even used in 
real-time while these suppression hearings were going on. At Guantanamo 
Bay, detainees are held in various camps located about ten miles from the 
courthouse. JTF-GTMO security rules require that detainees be frisked, 
blindfolded, and have soundproof earmuffs placed on their heads as a van 
transfers them to and from court. On the first day of suppression hearings, 
the detainee, Omar Khadr, refused to attend the hearing because he objected 
to these security precautions, arguing through his attorneys, that the transfer 
van already had blacked out windows so such extreme security precautions 
were merely designed to be humiliating.182 In addition, the detainee also 
claimed that the guards violated him during the frisking process.183 These 
claims soon overshadowed the actual hearings. The next day of the hear-
ings, the detainee again claimed mistreatment due to his contention that 
being forced into blindfolds had caused immense pain to his eye that was 
damaged in the 2002 firefight.184 This claim again overshadowed the hear-
ings, despite the fact that the detainee was observed playing basketball with 
other detainees later that evening.185 
IV.  PROPAGANDA V. REALITY 
There is little doubt that accused al-Qaeda detainees and their advo-
cates have succeeded in shaping the negative public and legal perceptions of 
  
180 Steven Edwards, Khadr‟s Health Becomes Issue at U.S. Base Hearings, CANWEST 
NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 29, 2010, http://www.canada.com/news/Khadr+health+becomes+ 
issue+base+hearings/2965681/story.html. 
181 Id.  
182 Id. 
183 Michelle Shephard, At Omar Khadr Hearing, U.S. Officer Explains Changing Battle 
Report, THE STAR, May 1, 2010, available at http://www.thestar.com/specialsections/ 
article/803378--at-omar-khadr-hearing-u-s-officer-explains-changing-battle-report. 
184 Id. 
185 Shephard, supra note 183 (―Military judge Col. Patrick Parrish ordered the proceedings 
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GTMO. It is exceptionally common in both the United States and abroad to 
equate detainee detention with torture, orange jumpsuits, and cages.186 
Shaping the GTMO reputation and policy through lawfare tactics in and of 
itself is a victory for those who constantly flood the legal and administrative 
process with accusations of torture. Moreover, the cumulative approach to 
using the torture narrative under the tactical lawfare concept also has direct-
ly affected operations on the battlefield.187 However, is it a victory for de-
tainees that likely will remain incarcerated for many years to come? 
A.  GTMO over Supermax: Life‟s a Beach 
While much of the world views GTMO as a horror-filled prison, the 
detainees know better. Individuals such as Ali al-Bahlul, who received a life 
sentence in a 2008 military commission for assisting Usama bin Laden‘s 
propaganda efforts, have many more freedoms at GTMO than they would in 
federal prison.188 In fact, given the choice between the federal ―supermax‖ 
prison in Florence, Colorado or GTMO, a seeming majority of detainees 
have indicated they would prefer to stay.189 ―They know that there will not 
be the same privileges as [GTMO],‖ a detainee liaison recently said, ―Given 
the choice of being sentenced forever in Guantanamo or moved to super-
max, it is ‗no, can I stay at GTMO?‘ Here they can be outside, they can 
smell the sea.‖190 
The differences between federal prison, which is governed by fed-
eral law, and the Department of Defense-run GTMO prison camps, which 
adhere to Geneva Conventions rules, is striking in terms of quality of life.
191
 
The federal supermax prison is where many of the most notorious federally 
convicted foreign terrorists reside.192 This includes those responsible for the 
1994 World Trade Center bombing, as well as Uzair Paracha. Supermax 
prisoners typically spend more than twenty-two hours a day locked within a 
single nine-by-nine foot cell.193 Their only source of natural light is seen 
through a skylight.194 Prisoners are not permitted to go outside.195 Exercise 
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is limited to about an hour a day during the week.196 Various reports indi-
cate that many inmates suffer psychological trauma for what is described as 
―severe isolation.‖197 
In contrast, throughout GTMO‘s first decade, it has adapted to rules 
typically required to prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions.198 
These freedoms are even more extensive than the Miami incarceration of 
ousted Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, who was treated as a prisoner 
of war from 1990 to his extradition to France in 2010 and consequently had 
among other items better food and was permitted to wear his military uni-
form.199 This means that even the most non-compliant GTMO detainees 
have access to the outdoors. Food is diverse and caters to religious diets.200 
Food and water also often is the same as what the guards and military per-
sonnel eat. In some of the camps, detainees are free to come and go from 
their rooms.201 One camp in particular includes a large soccer field that lies 
in view of classrooms and recreation rooms.202 Another camp for less com-
pliant detainees provides shaded and unshaded areas for detainees to exer-
cise or converse with others.203 Even the high-value detainees often have 
unfettered access to recreation, outdoors, and interaction among themselves. 
Cable television, books and newspapers are prevalent, where news channels 
such as al Jazzera are available for those who wish to watch.204 ―The Twi-
light,‖ a series of books geared toward teens involving a vampire/werewolf 
love triangle was reportedly particularly popular in early 2010.205 A typical 
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often joking around amongst each other, as well as praying together.206 Dur-
ing the 2010 World Cup soccer tournament, GTMO officials arranged for 
detainees to have unrestricted access to the televised coverage.207 Red Cross 
officials or legal counsel often make their way into the camps and can be 
seen conversing with detainees on any given day as well.208 Detainees also 
have relatively frequent access to their families back home via ICRC-
sponsored video/telephone communications (VTC).209 According to internal 
records, detainee complaints to camp personnel often relate to such mun-
dane issues as the salt and pepper levels in the food. But, GTMO is still a 
prison and is far from perfect. In 2009, a Pentagon review recommended 
that high-value detainees have even more interaction amongst each other.210 
And, controversies surrounding what some refer to as mind games between 
GTMO personnel and detainees, as well as isolation, continue to exist.211 
B.  Lawfare Tactic Backfires 
But, again, how many of those stories are truly legitimate? The is-
sues surrounding al Qahtani were certainly valid. But then there are items 
such as Abdel Aziz‘s ―unsubstantiated‖ thigh issue.212 In addition, hunger 
strikes often develop among the detainees. Speculation exist that these hun-
ger strikes are not organized by the detainees themselves, but instead coor-
dinated via the ―Detainee News Network (DNN).‖213 The goal of the hunger 
strikes is speculated to force GTMO personnel to attempt to force feed the 
detainees, thus providing some sort of recorded evidence to present in pub-
lic cases of ―mistreatment.‖ Moreover, speculation exists where detainees 
often make pre-determined plans among each other on when they will be 
disobedient.214 This is because it is well known in the camps that if a detai-
nee refuses to leave his cell, GTMO personnel will conduct what is referred 
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to as a Forced Cell Extraction.215 These extractions, which are reportedly 
often anticipated and directed by outside advocates, follow a detailed stan-
dard operating procedure and, more importantly to the defense, are recorded 
and documented.216 In other words, these outside influences, knowing that 
everything is documented, are seeking to use hunger strikes and forced cell 
extractions to manufacture evidence to be used as ammunition in legal pro-
ceedings as well as public opinion. 
However, perhaps the intended consequence of these actions was to 
put pressure on the U.S. Government to close the GTMO detention facility 
and transfer the detainees to U.S.-based prison facilities. Ultimately, the 
tactic was always to cast GTMO in the most negative light in order to bring 
down the entire wartime system of handling detainees. But, now that the 
goal is close to being achieved, the lawfare strategy of using the legal sys-
tem to force U.S. policy has been thrust in disarray as detainees begin to 
rebel against their advocates to some degree. As the option of actually being 
transferred became more real in 2009 as opposed to some far off goal, in-
siders and detainee attorneys both report that many detainees are starting to 
become uneasy with a potential move.217 Detainees reportedly relish the fact 
that they can enjoy the tropical environment and general liberties of GTMO 
while still maintaining street credentials as their peers back home continue 
to believe that they are suffering every day. At the same time, detainees 
shudder at the thought of being transferred to some place such as northern 
Illinois where they would have to remain indoors for much of the year.218 
Moreover, Algerian detainees in 2010 demanded in federal court that they 
be permitted to remain at GTMO rather than be repatriated to their home 
country where they feared actual torture.219 
Mark Falkoff, an attorney who represents numerous detainees rang-
ing in citizenship from Yemen to Pakistan, acknowledged the increasingly 
prevailing view in an early 2010 interview.220 Falkoff told Newsweek Mag-
azine that while his clients clearly want to go home, they are at least being 
held under Geneva Convention conditions at GTMO.221 A transfer to a place 
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such as Illinois, Falkoff continued, would equate to throwing the detainees 
into a supermax-type prison under near-lockdown conditions. Falkoff indi-
cated that ―[a]s far as [his] clients are concerned, it‘s probably preferable for 
them to remain at Guantanamo.‖222 
The case of Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani offers an additional example 
of detainee regret and sign of a flaw in the lawfare strategy. Ghailani was 
accused of involvement in the 1998 simultaneous bombings of U.S. embas-
sies in Kenya and Tanzania.223 He was captured and ultimately detained at 
GTMO.224 Ghailani raised issues of torture and mistreatment at the hands of 
the CIA, and ultimately won his release from the military commissions sys-
tem.225 Instead, he was to be tried in federal court in New York. But, similar 
to a tactic used by Khadr, Ghailani continuously refused to attend his feder-
al court hearings because he objected to the strip searches that were required 
to be conducted prior to transfer to court.226 Ghailani then expressed his 
desire to return to GTMO and be tried via a military commission.227 It is 
unknown whether this is merely another legal tactic or genuine desire, but it 
is interesting to note that Ghailani‘s psychologist was the initial person to 
raise this request during a hearing as opposed to an advocate or legal coun-
sel. 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to wage a sustained counterattack to the tactical lawfare in-
itiatives, it is recommended that legal options be complimented with less 
theoretical and consequently more practical solutions. This includes: 1) a 
uniform and attached detainee documentation form; 2) indigenous training; 
and 3) a unified media plan.228 
A.  A Uniform and Attached Detainee Documentation Form 
The government should adopt a uniform document relating to detai-
nee treatment and physical/mental health. This proposed internal-use docu-
ment would be standardized across all government agencies and geared 
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File: Lebowitz 2 Created on: 1/9/2011 9:48:00 PM Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:09:00 PM 
2010] THE VALUE OF CLAIMING TORTURE 389 
specifically toward detainees captured on the battlefield. The form will at-
tach itself to the detainee as soon as the detainee is taken into custody or as 
soon as practical as may be the case when large numbers of suspected com-
batants are captured. In this manner, as the detainee passes through various 
stages of confinement, information can continue to be added to this docu-
ment, which will follow the detainee through the life of his or her detention. 
Information will include preexisting injuries, breaks in reporting, and medi-
cal reviews at each stage so that oversight will always be available. 
Much of the relevant information is currently gathered and passed 
into detainee files via various scattered means depending on the custodial 
agency and location, as well as portable biometric equipment that can be 
collected at the initial point of capture. However, it is recommended that a 
single, standardized form be created beginning from as close to the point of 
capture as possible that encompasses all of the elements relating to the issue 
of detainee treatment. This standardized approach will compensate for the 
modern asymmetrical warfare approach where law enforcement agencies, 
military, and intelligence agencies have all engaged in capturing suspected 
enemy combatants on the global battlefield. This standardized form also 
may be classified at each level of the detainee‘s custody by a designated 
security reviewer. In this manner, the overall governmental interest in pro-
tecting national security assets will not be compromised by the need to doc-
ument detainee treatment. A legal officer embedded in the operational area 
as opposed to detached administrative locations also can better assist in a 
timely manner in ensuring proper and standardized documentation or action 
as it pertains to each individual detainee. While an extra layer of bureaucra-
cy is not always needed to fight an asymmetrical battle, this proposal would 
actually streamline the number of layers relating to individual detainee 
treatment as well as the process of investigating claims. 
The practical approach of this proposed standardized form is that it 
provides an easy review process for when abuse claims are reported. This 
means that commanders on the ground can quickly investigate such abuse 
claims and dispense of the erroneous ones quickly and seamlessly as op-
posed to engaging in a long and intensive process for each complaint. 
Moreover, the document, which for practical purposes will nearly always be 
classified as at least secret, will provide signed information of witnesses, 
medical personnel and chain of custody that can streamline the investigative 
process at all levels of the detainee‘s custody. Remember, the government 
typically has the burden of proof when a detainee alleges mistreatment in 
court. Therefore, this proposed document can become the standard and ac-
cepted courtroom and administrative rebuttal evidence to combat such alle-
gations. In military commissions and federal court, CIPA or MRCE 505 can 
be used to initiate classified court proceedings to review the document. In 
this post Detainee Treatment Act environment, creating and using this stan-
dardized evidentiary tool could cause the aforementioned tactical lawfare 
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approach to gradually fizzle out in the future as the complaints are seam-
lessly disproven in an organized fashion. At the same time, legitimate com-
plaints can be better separated from the faux torture. 
B.  Indigenous Training 
Related to the standardized documentation proposal, it is further 
recommended that indigenous forces be specifically trained to document 
detainee treatment prior to transfer of custody. The issue of indigenous 
abuse has been reported in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Such abuse 
was cited, for example, as a prime reason for the suppression of Muhammad 
Jawad‘s admissions and ultimate release from GTMO. Although it could 
take some time to fully gain compliance among indigenous forces, proper 
training in documenting detainee treatment in this area can only help in se-
parating legitimate claims from fake or exaggerated allegations. 
C.  A Unified Media Plan 
A unified media and public relations plan needs to be implemented, 
particularly when it comes to military commissions cases. The current mili-
tary public relations structure revolves almost exclusively around a Public 
Affairs Officer (PAO). The problem with this structure is that military 
PAOs are inherently reactionary to outside attacks. This means that the typ-
ical military public relations strategy is to wait for negative attention to de-
velop before a response is levied. By the time a PAO releases the govern-
ment side of the story, it is too late and public opinion is already slanted. 
This is true even if the government story is one hundred percent accurate. In 
an operational environment in Afghanistan, for example, unfounded claims 
of detainee abuse can quickly spiral into real-time violence and attacks 
against allied forces as literally hours matter in the war over public rela-
tions. At a grander level, the cumulative approach of claiming abuse causes 
such fallacies as the perception that GTMO is home to incessant torture, 
cages, and orange jumpsuits. At the trial level, outside organizations and 
advocates often control the narrative through spin that can be proven either 
fabricated or grossly uninformed. 
The unified media plan is meant to be proactive while maintaining 
ethical standards. Standard operating procedure should be to get the word 
out via traditional unclassified means as soon as practical in terms of man-
power and operational intelligence. Relating to a trial scenario, it is recom-
mended that two distinct teams operate to get the message out. In this plan, 
Team 1 will be the PAO. The PAO is the subject matter expert for the over-
all media universe and will be on hand for all press conferences and in-
formed of all media endeavors relating to the specific case. The PAO is best 
equipped to comment on overall and generalized questions pertaining to the 
legal process. Meanwhile, Team 2 relates to the prosecutors. The prosecu-
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tors are the subject matter experts for the specific case. In other words, the 
prosecutors‘ lane focuses solely on the case-specific factual information as 
prescribed under American Bar Association or complimentary ethical 
guidelines. All other questions will be deferred to the PAO. Once charges 
are sworn, the government will be able to state the case-specific truth under 
the ethical bar guidelines afforded to the prosecution. In fact, these ethical 
rules would provide a safeguard in terms of preventing the prosecution from 
deviating beyond the general, unrhetorical facts. But, the ultimate goal of 
this unified media recommendation is to place the government on equal 
footing in terms of getting the real story out as opposed to a completely 
skewed version. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives have engaged in a nuanced form of 
lawfare that is more tactical in nature.229 This tactical lawfare concept has a 
direct impact on military and intelligence operations from the lowest levels 
on up.230 While traditional lawfare approaches relate to broader, bigger at-
tacks against mostly western governments, the use of tactical lawfare has 
manifested itself directly on the battlefield by achieving tactical goals that 
historically were limited to conventional physical acts of warfare.231 As 
such, military and intelligence tactics have changed, personnel are diverted 
from engaging in operational or support roles, and operational momentum is 
stunted among other results.232 
Much of the tactical lawfare success revolves around the principle 
of claiming detainee abuse regardless of merit. Of course, the U.S. Govern-
ment did itself no favors by condoning limited instances of detainee abuse 
between 2001 and 2005.233 But, while those instances were certainly limited 
in scope, they essentially removed the government‘s benefit of the doubt on 
the detainee treatment issue and consequently left an opening within the 
legal and administrative system to be exploited.234 In addition, U.S. allies 
such as the United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Australia were deemed compli-
cit and ultimately fell under similar levels of courtroom exploitation.235 
Armed with this foundation of documented abuse, accused terror operatives 
initiated a cumulative practice of inundating legal and administrative sys-
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tems with allegation after allegation of torture. Some claims had merit while 
many others were murky at best. But, regardless of the merits, the global 
and cumulative tactic succeeded in directly altering the fight on the battle-
field. Hence, the concept of tactical lawfare. 
While the overall lawfare approach has been rather successful, it 
has perhaps been waged too well to some degree.236 Particularly with the 
Obama administration‘s attempt to transfer GTMO detainees to a U.S. pris-
on facility, the impact of this cumulative approach has come to roost at the 
individual detainee level.237 Starting in late 2009, detainees and their advo-
cates have found themselves in the awkward position of demanding that 
they remain at GTMO due to the better living conditions and/or to avoid 
torture in their home countries.238 Meanwhile, although western govern-
ments have been slow to recognize the tactical lawfare effect on their ability 
to wage war against terrorist organizations, efforts have begun to fight back. 
As such, a system is needed that can counter the tactical lawfare attacks at 
every stage of the detainee process. This means recognizing that tactical 
lawfare is an enemy strategy and working to diminish its success as early as 
possible during the course of a detainee‘s custody. By starting at the begin-
ning of detention to cut off a detainee‘s ability to wage a meritless claim of 
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